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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC INFORMATION IN U.S. FISHERIES POLICY: 
GAPS BE1WEEN THEORY, INFORMATION AND CAPABILI1Y 
Fisheries management agencies in the United States are increasingly being called upon 
to incorporate economic and social information into fisheries management decisions. 
This increased "people orientation" of fisheries management is limited by two factors. 
First, the base of empirical studies on which to draw for the needed information 
frequently contains results which are only partially applicable to the policy decision. 
Second, fisheries management agencies in most cases do not employ economists or other 
social scientists at the policy making level who are involved in the design of management 
policies which provide appropriate economic incentives and incorporate the limited 
information which is available. 
Empirical results are limited for two reasons. First, there has been rapid improvement 
in theoretical and quantitative models for estimation of the net economic value or 
welfare of fisheries resources (consumer surplus, producers surplus, etc.). As a result, 
there has not been sufficient time for the accumulation of empirical information about 
fishery resource values based on consistent theory and estimation methods. Second, 
there is a bias in U.S. funding of research toward the development of new theoretical 
and quantitative tools to the neglect of obtaining the needed empirical estimates on 
which to base management decisions. 
Resource management agencies in the U.S. fail to employ economists at the policy 
making level for two reasons. First, resource management agency heads have not made 
the transition from the "management of fish" to the "management of people." Second, 
they are not aware of the contributions that economists make to the policy frameworks 
of other areas such as agriculture. The major focus of this paper is on discussion of the 
gaps between theory and resulting empirical knowledge, with a more limited focus on 
how the lack of economists at the policy making level limits the types of policies in place 
for U.S. fisheries. There are two major requirements if economics and other social 
sciences are to take their proper role in fisheries management. First, increased support 
for the data base and the social science research base is required. Second, economists 
and other social scientists must become integral parts of the fisheries management policy 
process. 
ECONOMIC INFORMATION IN U.S. FISHERIES POLICY: 
GAPS BE1WEEN THEORY, INFORMATION AND CAPABILITY 
Introduction 
Fisheries management agencies in the United States are increasingly being called 
upon to incorporate economic and social information into fisheries management 
decisions. This call comes in part from an increased desire by policy makers to base 
policy decisions on the economic contribution of the various fisheries being managed, 
and on the potential economic contribution of alternative management strategies to the 
values generated by the fisheries. Many of these concerns involve enterprises beyond 
the fishery. Toxic emissions, for example, have major implications for fisheries, but must 
be complied with by manufacturing and other industrial enterprises which are outside 
the usual scope of fisheries managers. 
In addition, over-exploitation of many fisheries as a result of increased pressure 
by commercial and recreational interests has shown the failure of management policies 
which "manage for fish" rather than "manage for people." In recent experience, every 
new seafood fad in the U.S. has resulted in the depletion of one or more fish stocks. 
The blackened redfish case is a recent striking example. Numerous other examples are 
emerging along the east coast of the USA Fresh fish counters in the USA now contain 
many wild-caught seafood species that were ignored five years ago. Calls for new tools 
of management to prevent over exploitation of fisheries and address the needs of 
commercial and recreational anglers are increasingly heard. These tools are largely 
within purview of the social scientist, and not of the biologist/manager. 
The increased implementation of a "people orientation" in fisheries management 
is limited by two factors. First, the base of economic theory and empirical studies from 
which to draw the needed information frequently contains results which are only partially 
applicable to the policy decision. Rapid development of new theoretical concepts and 
a lag in empirical studies using these concepts means our empirical information base is 
not adequate. Second, fisheries management agencies in most cases do not employ 
economists or other social scientists at the policy making level. For people oriented 
policies, economists and other social scientists must be involved in the design of 
management policies with appropriate economic incentives which incorporate the limited 
information which is available. 
What we face in the USA is a diminishing data base of fisheries information, a 
limited number of studies of the recreational demand for particular fisheries, and very 
limited experience with economic based management strategies. The primary objective 
of this paper is to examine the gaps between economic theory and the resulting empirical 
knowledge base needed to evaluate fisheries and to develop appropriate economic based 
policies to manage fisheries. A second objective is to show by implication how 
economists and other social scientists can contribute to fisheries management policy. An 
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implicit final objective is to show how the lack of economists and other social scientists 
at the policy making level limits the types of policies in place for U.S. fisheries. There 
are two major requirements if economics and other social sciences are to take their 
proper role in fisheries management. First, increased support for the data base and the 
social science research base is required. Second, economists and other social scientists 
must become integral parts of the fisheries management policy process. 
Barriers to Improyed Information and Policies 
The empirical information base is limited for two reasons. First, there has been 
rapid improvement in theoretical and quantitative models for estimation of the net 
economic value or welfare of fisheries resources (consumer surplus, producers surplus, 
etc.). The travel cost approach has been improved significantly since it was first 
suggested by Hotelling (1949), both in terms of theoretical specification and of empirical 
estimation (see Table 1 for definitions of terms). In addition, the contingent valuation 
(CV) approach is a more recent approach which provides the potential to estimate 
existence and option values of recreational resources as well as user values. Likewise, 
the status of economic policy tools such as taxes, subsidies and transferable quotas is 
largely one of textbook models with few specific applications to particular problems or 
settings. The experimental use and study of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) is 
a notable exception. There has not been sufficient time for the accumulation of the 
necessary broad empirical information base about fishery resource values or the 
effectiveness of economic management tools based on consistent theory and empirical 
methods. 
Second, there is a bias in USA funding of research toward the development of 
new theoretical and quantitative tools to the neglect of obtaining the needed empirical 
estimates on which to base management decisions. While the development of new 
theoretical approaches has been highly productive, balance is needed between the 
theoretical and empirical if the information base for policy is to be adequate. 
Rapid Development of Theocy 
The economic theories underlying the evaluation and management of natural 
resources are relatively new. As a result, the core models have changed substantially as 
economists have attempted to resolve core evaluation and management issues. The 
development and implementation of new tools to evaluate and manage recreational and 
commercial fisheries are discussed. The economic evaluation literature is discussed first 
followed by a discussion of the status in using economic policy tools in fisheries 
management. 
In the economic management of fisheries, there are two elements of the 
information base which are essential. First, information is needed about how various 
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fisheries are valued for recreational and commercial purposes. For commercial fisheries 
which sell their product in economic markets, standard market economic tools are 
usually sufficient if adequate data exists and major externalities are not present. To 
obtain this information for recreational fisheries, one needs an adequate data base on 
the recreational behavior of people and reliable estimates from this data base on how 
people value various recreational sites. Second, studies of the response of commercial 
and recreational anglers to alternative tools or techniques for the management of a 
fishery are required. In this section, I focus first on the evolution of tools to estimate 
the economic value of recreational fisheries, followed by an evaluation of our ability to 
use economic tools to manage fisheries. 
Economic Valuation of Recreational Fisheries 
The major national source of data for recreational fishing behavior in the USA 
is the National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife Associated Recreation published 
every five years by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Most recreational studies, 
however, are based on special data surveys for the particular fishery being studied. 
Hotelling (1949) made the original suggestion for the travel cost method (see 
Table 1). Dwyer et al. (1977) review early development of the travel cost method which 
involved estimation of the equation 
(1) Trips/visits = f(trip cost, population of zone, proximity of 
substitute sites, site quality). 
These early models were estimated using zonal or area data on number of visits from 
predefined zones and characteristics of each zone from which visits were made. As 
researchers began to collect data on individual recreational behavior, they began 
estimating travel cost models using this individual based data. Most of these estimates 
were biased in one or more ways, through use of continuous estimation methods on 
truncated data sets, use of data which did not sample the complete population of 
potential users of a site, and omission of the value of travel time. Sorg and Loomis 
(1984), Walsh, Johnson and McKean (1988) and Smith, Palmquist and Jakus (1989) have 
developed procedures to adjust these biased estimates to a more comparable basis. 
However, comparison with more recent studies using unbiased procedures suggest 
that these adjustments are not adequate. Table 2 provides the estimates of economic 
value per day from AFS (forthcoming 1992a). Nearly all of the travel cost (TCM) 
estimates were made using ordinary least squares and adjusted using Sorg and Loomis. 
Two exceptions are the Ohio estimates for walleye and yellow perch, which were 
estimated using a truncated least squares or conditional maximum likelihood estimator. 
The comparable estimates from ordinary least squares were about $25 per day, or five 
times greater (Hushak et al. 1988). The Sorg and Loomis correction is about 20 
percent. 
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Perhaps the most important development was the derivation and standardization 
of censored and truncated econometric procedures (Maddala 1983). These procedures 
permitted joint accounting for changes in participation rates and for changes in the 
frequency of participation as trip costs changed. There were important theoretical 
developments as well. In what follows, I limit discussion to developments within the 
travel cost literature, excluding discussion of contingent valuation methods. 
Bockstael, Hanemann and Strand (no date) and Bockstael, Strand and Hanemann 
(1987) developed models which distinguish between those who can substitute work and 
leisure time and those who cannot. Kealy and Bishop (1986) specified their model in 
terms of recreation days rather than trips or visits in order to account for trips of varying 
duration. McConnell and Strand (1981) and Smith, Desvousages and McGivney (1983) 
provide techniques for estimating the value placed on human time during recreation 
trips. Pollak and Wales (1980, 1981) provided models for the incorporation of 
demographic characteristics of recreators into demand models. The repackaging model 
of Wilman ( 1987) specifies a procedure where trips of differing characteristics can be 
grouped into subsets of trips, and then demand functions for each type of trip with 
substitution between types of trips are estimated. 
What is probably the most prominent approach uses a two-step hedonic model 
originally proposed by Rosen (1974 ), called the Hedonic Travel Cost Function (Smith 
and Palmquist 1989, Smith, Palmquist and Jakus 1989). In the first step, hedonic 
equations of the form 
(2) Price = f(quantity/quality of recreation site amenities) 
are estimated. In step 2 called the Hedonic Travel Cost Function, the hedonic price (the 
regression coefficient of each amenity in equation 1) is regressed on the vector of 
amenities 
(3) HP = g(quantity/quality of recreation site amenities) 
where HP is the hedonic price. 
A major problem with this approach is that the coefficient of each amenity in 
equation 2 is regressed back on the quantity of that amenity in equation 3. Brown and 
Mendelsohn (1984) propose market segmentation where separate hedonic equations 2 
are estimated for each market segment. The "independent" estimates of the hedonic 
price of each segment are then used to estimate equation 3. Kriesel (1988) attempted 
to use this model to estimate the marginal value of added years of expected life of 
shoreline property. He used the hedonic equation 2, but backed away from using step 
2 because he was unable to segment his market. Smith, Palmquist and Jakus (1989) use 
multiple hedonic price equations 2 in generating hedonic prices for use in equation 3. 
Caulkins, Bishop and Bouwes (1986) address site quality issues using a multinomial logit 
model, a potential alternative to the hedonic travel cost model. 
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Jeng (1990), in her attempts to estimate the repackaging model of Wilman (1987), 
developed the hedonic price equation 2 for the estimation of endogenous trip prices 
which include endogenous on-site monetary and human time costs, 
( 4) Price = h( trip duration, recreator characteristics). 
Since trip duration is also endogenous, it is predicted by the equation, 
(5) Trip duration = h'(distance, recreator characteristics). 
Since Jeng's focus (see also Hushak and Jeng 1990) was on trip duration and on 
respondent characteristics, her problem was to generate a trip price which incorporated 
on-site costs of a heterogeneous trip which varied in duration, but excluded elements of 
on-site costs which reflected tastes, income or other factors. This "predicted" price, as 
estimated from equation 4 as the predictable portion of reported trip price, was then 
used as the trip price in the recreation demand equation, 
( 6) Trips = k(price, recreator characteristics). 
Jeng successfully estimated this model using data subsamples of recreators who 
can and cannot substitute work and leisure time as suggested by Bockstael, Strand and 
Hanemann (1987). However, her attempts to separate the sample into trips of varying 
duration (a major trip characteristic) to estimate Wilman's repackaging model were not 
successful because of high multicolinearity across the prices of trips of varying duration. 
Estimates of economic value in the form of willingness-to-pay or consumer surplus 
from these models is a base for fisheries policy or management (see Table 1 for 
definitions of terms). They provide insights about how various fisheries are valued by 
recreators and other users and the potential benefits from various management 
strategies. However, the rapidly changing nature of the theoretical models and the 
necessarily preliminary nature of the estimates mean that economists are required to use 
them on policy decisions. 
One example of the need for economic value information is the development of 
a strategy by the American Fisheries Society (AFS) to assist fisheries managers in 
assessing damages in fish-kills due to toxic substance discharges or other reasons. In 
1982, AFS published a document which contained guidelines for counting dead fish in 
fish kills and the hatchery costs of replacing these fish. Since 1982, several states have 
implemented procedures for assessing damages from fish kills based on these guidelines. 
These procedures are adequate where killed fish can be replaced immediately 
with like sized fish. However, they lack the capability of assessing damages due to lost 
recreational days where the fishery is allowed to rehabilitate itself through natural 
processes or where smaller fish are stocked and allowed to grow to the size of killed fish. 
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In 1989, under a grant from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Socioeconomics 
section of AFS undertook a project to update the hatchery cost estimates, and also to 
compile the existing literature on economic values of lost recreational and commercial 
fishing days by state and by species (AFS-SE 1992a, 1992b ). 
This latter component is an attempt to compile the information base to assess fish 
kill damages on the basis of lost fishing days and/ or lost harvest. We found a large 
number of studies. The compilation of results of these studies for freshwater studies is 
shown in Table 2. But, given the rapid change in theory and the large number of 
fisheries and fish species, we seldom found more than one study for any given species 
in a specific fishery. In addition, studies of a given species across fisheries are usually 
done with sufficiently different methodologies and data limitations that comparability 
across species is questionable. 
Economic Tools for the Manaeement of Fisheries 
The current typical approach to fisheries management in the USA is of the 
general form of fishing seasons, daily bag limits or quotas on individual species and for 
individual anglers (commercial or recreational). If anglers were to respond to these 
tools in the way desired by the management agency, then over exploitation would not 
occur and fisheries would not be destroyed. 
Commercial fishermen, however, are economically rational people and they 
harvest fish as long as the cost of harvesting an additional fish does not exceed the price 
they are paid for it at the dock. If each commercial fisherman owned his/her own plot 
of fishery and had the right to exclude others from fishing in the area as farmers do, they 
would take account of stock changes and implications for future harvests, and not over 
harvest their fishery plot. 
Sport anglers, likewise, want to engage in fishing as long as the satisfaction gained 
from fishing exceeds its monetary and time costs to them. As with commercial 
fishermen, sport anglers do not realize that in catching and harvesting fish, they are, 
jointly with other anglers, contributing to significant decreases in the total stock of fish 
in the fishery. 
Common property resources existed and were successfully managed throughout 
history. In many places in Europe and elsewhere, over long periods of time, these 
resources were successfully "managed" by the people using them through various 
community sanctions against anyone violating the trust of the "commons." These systems 
of management were successful during periods of stability; during periods when 
technology was stable and when the demands for the goods and services provided by the 
commons were stable. They required the ability of the common users to impose 
sanctions on each other and to limit the use of the commons by those who were not one 
of the common "owners." 
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However, the conditions under which the requirements for successful management 
of the commons can be imposed are fragile. When technology changed or when new 
demands on the resources of the commons arose, the implicit sanctions tended to break 
down as well. When the common "owners" lose control of the commons, the resource(s) 
become what we call "open access" where everyone has rights to use of the resource 
without a means of imposing sanctions, except by government. In the case of redfish, 
a working situation broke down because of increased demand for redfish resulting in 
incentives to increase the commercial harvest of redfish which the then existing policy 
was unable to control. 
The case of redfish is an example of what Harden (1968) calls the 'Tragedy of the 
Commons." In trying to maximize profits, fishermen do not recognize how their 
individual actions in aggregate serve to deplete the fishery. To restore stability to an 
open access resource, one must restore a set of sanctions or incentives to convince users 
to reduce use to sustainable levels. An improved information base from travel cost or 
contingent valuation studies on how resources are valued would improve our ability to 
predict when an existing situation is likely to break down by being better able to predict 
changes in demand for the resource. 
This 'Tragedy of the Commons" is illustrated in Figure 1 from Tietenberg (1984 
p. 196). For discussion purposes, it is assumed that fish price is constant so that any 
variation in revenues is due to changes in fishing harvest resulting from changes in 
fishing effort. For the fishery as a whole, each unit of increased effort results in 
declining marginal revenue in the lower portion of Figure 1 because of reduced harvest 
per unit of effort. However, each angler, commercial or recreational, has such a small 
impact on the harvest rate that each experiences the average revenue or harvest rate as 
its marginal revenue rate. When the average = marginal revenue for the individual 
angler is equal to marginal = average cost at a level of fishing effort which exceeds the 
maximum revenue point of the upper portion or the marginal revenue = 0 point b in the 
lower portion of Figure 1, then the fishery will be depleted. To prevent the 'Tragedy 
of the Commons," management policy must reduce fishing effort below level b. 
Management strategies such as fishing seasons, bag limits or quotas tell anglers, 
commercial or recreational, to stop fishing when, in their view, it is still profitable to do 
so, i.e., their "marginal" revenue from additional fishing effort at any level less than point 
c exceeds marginal cost. Anglers have incentives to ''break" the law, and evidence 
suggests strongly that they do so. The record of success for these strategies is not good; 
some would argue that it is dismal! Therefore, there has been increasing call to try the 
tools of the economist which more directly impose total fishery stock effects on 
individual anglers, commercial or recreational. 
Economists suggest several policy tools which can incorporate the aggregate 
effects of fish harvests on fish stocks into the incentive structure faced by commercial or 
recreational fishermen (Tietenberg, Howe 1979). Where feasible, the most effective 
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policy would be to assign long-term property or harvest rights to individual commercial 
anglers over explicit areas of water. This type of policy would work where species are 
not highly mobile and where the citizenry, including sport anglers, accept limitations on 
access to the fishery waters. Such a policy would create "mini.. fisheries where each 
angler faced the downward sloping marginal revenue curve in Figure 1. In most cases, 
however, such policies are not feasible for one or both reasons, at least in the USA 
Where property rights assignments are not feasible, economists recommend 
alternative incentive policies such as taxes or subsidies, input purchases, or several forms 
of quotas. Taxes may be levied on units of fish harvested or on inputs such as the size 
of the fishing vessel, the size and type of gear or the amount of labor. Or, subsidies may 
be paid to producers to idle resources, such as payments for so many days of use of a 
fishing vessel. In Figure 1, these taxes or subsidies have the effect of raising the 
marginal = average cost curve. This subsidy strategy has been used for many years in 
USA agriculture to purchase the annual services of land from landowners in order to 
reduce crop output. While economists argue that such a subsidy strategy is not efficient 
because it only affects one input, e.g., commercial anglers would use other resources 
(vessels not idled, labor, and harvest gear) more intensively, it is much more effective 
than seasons, bag limits or quotas. 
Another economic based management strategy which has potential in fisheries 
management is to purchase inputs from producers. In USA agriculture policy, there are 
provisions for long term idling of sensitive lands through longer term agreements, usually 
of about 10 years. In Ohio, the Division of Wildlife was legislatively forced in 1982 to 
purchase gill nets from commercial anglers to reduce yellow perch harvest and the 
incidental catch of walleye. The gill net is by far the most effective and efficient harvest 
gear for yellow perch. While even economists would have argued that this strategy was 
not efficient nor needed at the time it was implemented, it was effective in reducing 
yellow perch harvest and eliminating incidental harvest of walleye. The purchase of 
certain types of harvest gear, thereby eliminating it from use in a fishery, can be an 
effective and reasonably efficient strategy where destruction of a fish stock is occurring, 
or where bycatch is a serious issue. 
Quotas of various types have been used by fisheries managers, but are effective 
and efficient management tools only under certain conditions. The first condition is that 
harvest can be monitored under the quota because a quota does not have a direct effect 
on the marginal cost of harvesting fish. If this is true then Tietenberg (p. 204) lists three 
conditions for efficient quotas. 
1. The quotas entitle the holder to catch a specified weight of fish. 
2. The total amount of fish authorized by the quotas held by all fishermen 
should be equal to the efficient catch for the fishery. 
3. The quotas should be freely transferable among fishermen. 
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It is important that the quota be on quantity of fish harvested. Quotas on days of 
fishing, which do not consider variations in fishing effort per fishing day, provide 
incentives for increased vessel size or increased gear and/ or labor per vessel because 
anglers still have the incentive to engage in more effort than the optimal level. The 
second condition is necessary for optimal harvest, and also makes obvious the need for 
effective monitoring. Finally, efficient quotas must be transferable among angler~ 
because of differing costs per unit of fishing effort across commercial fishing firms. 
Higher cost firms must be able to sell their quota to more efficient or lower cost firms 
in order to minimize the cost of harvest for any given fishery. 
While we are still far from effective and/ or efficient management of fisheries, the 
individual transferable quota or ITO is being accepted as a management tool by fisheries 
managers and by commercial anglers. Anderson (1989) and other papers in Neher et 
al. (1989) discuss ITQs and ITO policies in the various fisheries in which they are being 
used. The International Joint Commission (UC) and U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (USEP A) have begun to examine how to use economic tools to reduce toxic 
emissions into the Great Lakes and other bodies of water. While these are encouraging 
signs, there is little evidence of the acceptability of other strategies in fisheries 
management unless forced on them from outside, as in the case of Ohio's purchase of 
gill net fishing rights. 
Inadequate Data Bases 
Federal statistical budgets in the USA declined in real terms during most of the 
1980s, and have only begun to recover (OMB 1992 and earlier issues). My perception 
of USA fisheries agencies (Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine Fisheries Service) 
is that they are not very concerned about data, economic or biological. 
Recreational valuation studies have been completed at widely differing dates, 
using data which is inadequate in one or more ways, and using biased statistical 
estimation methods. We are only at the beginning stages of assessing the use of various 
economic management tools in the "real" management of fisheries. It is from this 
sketchy and inadequate base of research studies that we develop and justify management 
plans for fisheries. 
The social scientist needs the support and assistance of fisheries agencies in 
gathering the necessary data and in obtaining the needed financial support to carry out 
the research necessary to develop the data base. At present, USA funding agencies are 
biased strongly toward development of new theories and away from base data collection 
and application of frontier theory in the estimation and evaluation of economic policies. 
Further, the social scientist must become an integral part of fisheries policy making if 
effective use is to be made of economic policy tools. 
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Implications for Improved Policy 
Economists and other social scientists need access at the policy making level to 
effectively bring economic and social science policy tools to fisheries management. One 
cannot expect biologists to incorporate sophisticated policy tools into management 
strategies any more than the social scientist could be expected to incorporate biological 
information and policy tools into a management strategy. The development stage of 
economic and other social policy tools amplifies the need for economists and other social 
scientists at the policy making level. 
Resource management agencies in the USA have not made rapid progress to 
incorporating economists and other social scientists at the policy making level for two 
reasons. First, resource management agency heads have not made the transition from 
the "management of fish" to the "management of people." Until they recognize that 
incorporating human behavioral responses into the policy process are critical to policy 
success, continued progress will be slow. Second, they are not aware of the contributions 
that economists and other social scientists make to the policy frameworks of other areas 
such as agriculture. Such awareness on their part would increase confidence that the 
social sciences have much to contribute. 
If economics and other social sciences are to take their proper role in fisheries 
management, there are two major requirements. First, increased support for the data 
base and the social science research base is required. Second, economists and other 
social scientists must become integral parts of the fisheries management policy process. 
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Table 1. Definitions of Terms, Concepts, and Methods 
Definitions of Concepts 
Gross Willingness-To-Pay: The total amount one is willing to pay for a resource or 
amenity rather than go without it. It is approximated by the area under the demand or 
average revenue curve up to the level of consumption in Figure 1. 
(Net) Willingness-To-Pay: Gross willingness-to-pay minus the costs of purchasing the 
output. In Figure 1, it is approximated the area under the demand or average revenue 
curve and above the price or average cost line. 
Consumer Surplus: An approximation of willingness-to-pay as defined as the area under 
the demand or average revenue curve and above the price or average cost line. 
Use Value: The value placed on a resource or amenity by an individual for its use in 
recreational activities such as the value of a particular fishery or the value of a 
population of fish within the fishery. 
Existence Value: The value placed on a resource or amenity by an individual because 
of its existence irrespective of use, such as placing a positive value on a population of 
fish even if one never fishes. 
Option Value: The value placed on a resource or amenity by an individual to maintain 
the possibility of using the resource or amenity at some future time, such as placing a 
positive value on a population of fish because one might want to fish for them at a 
future time. 
Definitions of Methods 
Travel Cost (Recreation) Demand (TC): An approximate demand for recreation 
activities using proxy variables such as number of trips for quantity demanded and the 
cost of travel and other recreation expenses for price. The estimated TC demand 
function allows estimation of consumer surplus. 
Contingent Valuation (CV): The direct questioning of individuals about the valuation 
placed on recreational or other resources or amenities. The CV method can be used for 
direct estimation of willingness-to-pay, existence value, or option value. 
Hedonic Function: The relationship between the price or value of a recreational or 
other resource or amenity and the characteristics of that amenity. The hedonic price is 
the contribution of a particular characteristic, such as fishing quality, to the total price 
of a resource or amenity. 
11 
Table 2 (continued) 
state Valuation Species Economic 
Method Value 
($/day) 
Washington TCM coldwater $53.52 
TCM salmon river $26.35 
TCM steel head river $35.93 
CVM trout $16.07 
CVM salmon $118.62 
West Virginia CVM trout $16.07 
Wisconsin TCM coldwater $4.28 
TCM trout/salmon $16.76 
CVM trout $28.55 
Wyoming CVM trout $13.15 
CVM coldwater $22.18 
Regions: 
Rocky Mountains CVM coldwater $14.08 
Lake Mead TCM largemouth bass $91.21 
U.S. CVM bass $43.17 
CVM/TCM trout $46.83 
CVM/TCM anadromous $129.51 
CVM panf ish $43.17 
CVM catfish $34.17 
CVM pike/walleye $70.43 
CVM general $40.90 
TCM bass, etc. $88.61 
TCM other $86.34 
TCM coldwater $39.62 
TCM warmwater $35.18 
TCM rough fishing $26.31 
Table notes: 
Valuation Methods: CVM - Contingent Valuation Method 
TCM - Travel Cost Method 
Hedonic - Hedonic Method 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(5) 
(2) 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
(1) 
per trip 
Standardized Value: Average of studies using the same valuation technique 
for the same state and species. These numbers are adjusted for 
methodoligal differences and updated to 1989 values using the CPI 
( ) Indicates number of studies in sample 
For explanation of valuation methods and standardization process please see 
Recommended Procedures for Accounting for Economic Damages Due to Fish-Kills 
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Table 2 (continued) 
state Valuation - Species Economic 
Method Value 
($/day) 
Mississippi No Studies 
Missouri TCM/CVM trout $22.38 (2) 
Montana TCM coldwater lake $37.47 (1) 
TCM coldwater str. $55.22 (1) 
CVM trout $17.53 (1) 
Nebraska CVM trout $19.00 (1) 
Nevada CVM trout $16.07 (1) 
CVM coldwater $22.18 (1) 
New Hampshire CVM trout $10.23 (1) 
New Jersey CVM trout $14.61 (1) 
New ·Mexico TCM warmwater $28.08 (1) 
CVM trout $20.46 (1) 
New York TCM coldwater $39.86 (3) 
TCM muskellunge riv $99.16 (1) 
TCM muskellunge lk. $26.21 (1) 
TCM all $58.13 (2) 
TCM lake $30.07 (1) 
TCM stream $40.17 (1) 
North Carolina CVM trout $14.61 (1) 
North Dakota CVM trout $17.53 (1) 
Ohio TCM walleye $4.96 (1) 
TCM yellow perch $4.08 (1) 
TCM walleye/perch $15.32 (1) 
CVM trout $10.23 (1) 
Oklahoma CVM trout $29.22 (1) 
Oregon TCM coldwater $95.77 (1) 
TCM steel head $71.88 (2) 
TCM salmon/ $49.61 (1) 
steel head 
TCM salmon river $26.35 (1) 
TCM steelhead river $35.93 (1) 
TCM coho $37.36 (1) per trip 
TCM steelhead $55.72 (1) per trip 
CVM trout $17.53 (1) 
Pennsylvania CVM trout $11.69 (1) 
Rhode Island CVM trout $13.15 (1) 
South Carolina CVM trout $11.69 (1) 
South Dakota CVM trout $17.53 (1) 
Tennessee TCM coldwater $43.84 (1) 
Texas CVM trout $35.07 (1) 
Utah CVM trout $16.07 (1) 
CVM coldwater $22.18 (1) 
Vermont CVM trout $10.23 (1) 
Virginia CVM trout $16.07 (1) 
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Table 2. Average Valuation of Freshwater Recreational Fishing 
State Valuation Species Economic 
Method Value 
($/day) 
Alabama CVM trout $29.22 (1) 
Alaska CVM trout $40.91 (1) 
Arizona TCM/CVM trout $17.12 (3) 
TCM/CVM coldwater $74.65 (3) 
TCM warmwater $145.49 (1) per trip 
TCM coldwater $158.83 (1) per trip 
Arkansas CVM trout $21.92 (1) 
California TCM coldwater $21.04 (1) 
CVM trout $23.38 (1) 
Colorado CVM trout $16.80 (2) 
CVM cold water $16.46 (4) 
conriecticut CVM trout $11.69 (1) 
CVM all $10.81 (3) 
Delaware CVM trout $16.07 (1) 
Florida TCM warmwater $37.85 (1) 
CVM all $17.43 (1) 
CVM trout $13.15 (1) 
Georgia TCM warmwater $34.50 (1) 
CVM trout $14.61 (1) 
Hawaii No Studies 
Idaho TCM/CVM coldwater $23.95 (6) 
TCM/CVM warmwater $24.73 (6) 
TCM/CVM steel head $22.34 (6) 
CVM mixed $14.87 (1) 
TCM cold/mixed $32.25 (1) 
TCM warm/mixed $35.14 (1) 
CVM trout $18.89 (1) 
Illinois CVM trout $24.84 (1) 
Indiana CVM trout $13.15 (1) 
Iowa CVM trout $29.22 (1) 
Kansas CVM trout $24.84 (1) 
Kentucky TCM coldwater $11.74 (1) 
CVM trout $19.00 (1) 
Louisiana Hedonic warmwater $36.31 (1) 
Maine TCM coldwater $33.61 (1) 
CVM trout $13.15 (1) 
Maryland CVM trout $19.00 (1) 
Massachusetts CVM trout $13.15 (1) 
Michigan TCM/CVM trout $17.86 (2) 
Minnesota TCM coldwater $42.37 (1) 
CVM trout $20.46 (1) 
Source: AFS, forthcoming, 1992a. 
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Figure 1. Market Allocation in a Common-Property Fishery. 
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